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Abstract 
This paper argues for updating and reform of the liquidation duty under Chinese 
corporate law. It adopts an evolutionary perspective on corporate law in the sense of 
asking whether the corporate laws co-evolve with, and adapt to the changing conditions 
of a country, rather than whether laws are converging towards a certain ‘developed’ 
model.  
 
In some jurisdictions, directors have a creditor-regarding duty when the company is 
insolvent or near insolvency and this duty is intended to constrain ‘moral hazard’ issues 
on the part of corporate insiders. In China, such moral hazard issues are mitigated by 
the liquidation duty. This paper argues that while the liquidation duty is relatively 
effective, it has created unfairness and undermined the value of formal insolvency law. 
Drawing on the experience of other jurisdictions especially the UK in relation to 
wrongful trading law, this paper suggests that a wrongful trading remedy and further 





As a majority of companies in China were resolved without formal insolvency, legal 
protection for creditors is usually enforced through the provisions of company law. 
Previous research has criticised the limited access to the formal bankruptcy procedure 
in China 1  but there has not been much discussion of other creditor protection 
mechanisms that are embedded in China’s unique corporate governance structure.  
 
This paper fills the gap by asking how the liquidation duty in Chinese corporate lawlaw 
- an effective complement to formal insolvency - might change and develop by 
selectively borrowing from so-called advanced jurisdictions such as the UK, the EU 
and the US. In China, shareholders in LLCs (private companiesLimited Liability 
Company) and directors/controlling shareholders of JSLCs (public companies) Joint 
Stock Limited Company)2 are subject to a liquidation duty (qingsuan yiwu 清算义务) 
that requires them to put the company into liquidation within a specified time i.e. 
making provision for the collection and realisation of assets and making distributions 
to creditors. Breach of the liquidation duty can result in joint and several liability for 
 
1 Roman Tomasic and Zinian Zhang, ‘From Global Convergence in China's Enterprise Bankruptcy Law 
2006 to Divergent Implementation: Corporate Reorganisation in China’ (2012) 12 Journal of Corporate 
Law Studies 295 and see also Stacey Steele; Andrew Godwin; Jin Chun; Han Changyin; Ren Yimin, 
‘Trends and Developments in Chinese Insolvency Law: The First Decade of the PRC Enterprise 
Bankruptcy Law’ (2018) 66 American Journal of Comparative Law 669. 
2 LLCs and JSLCs crudely corresponds to private companies and public companies. The discussion of 
this article will focus on LLCs that are used as vehicles for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). 
Despite the fact that LLCs are not exclusively SMEs, the LLC form is most attractive for SMEs in China. 
Compared to LLCs, JSLCs are characterised by more dispersed ownership and larger sizes. See R.C. Art 
& M. Gu, ‘China Incorporated: The First Corporation Law of the People’s Republic of China’ (1995) 20 
Yale Journal of International Law 273. 
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the relevant parties, including shareholders and directors. Breaching the liquidation 
duty is regarded as a statutory ground for veil piercing in China and it has been found 
that cases brought for breaching liquidation duty has the highest success rate in terms 
of veil piercing (85.19%), even outranking  outranking fraud which ranks the first 
among the other veil piercing factors.3 One of the main circumstances that triggers the 
liquidation duty is where the company’s business license is revoked by the relevant 
administrative authority; a circumstance confirmed in Guiding Case No.9 issued by the 
Supreme People’s Court (SPC).  
 
The liquidation duty is a measure unique to China that addresses opportunistic 
advantage-gaining behavior behaviour by corporate insiders when a company is 
insolvent or near insolvency. The liquidation duty resembles the UK wrongful trading 
provision which incentivise incentivises both directors and controlling shareholders to 
liquidate a company through formal procedures, with the threat that they might lose 
limited liability protection if they fail to do so. They differ however, in that the 
liquidation duty also applies to liquidation for reasons other than insolvency and it is 
enforceable by creditors individually outside the formal insolvency procedure. 
Moreover, reflective of the ‘shareholder-centred’ model of corporate governance in 
 
3 An empirical study has found that veil-piercing is used more frequently in China than in jurisdictions 
such as the US and UK. In addition to breaching liquidation duty (statutory ground), The the major 
factors considered by Chinese courts for veil-piercing include commingling of assets, business, or 
personnel, fraud, undue control, and undercapitalisation. See Hui Huang, ‘Piercing the Corporate Veil in 




China, the liquidation duty is imposed on all shareholders in LLCs as well as controlling 
shareholders in JSLCs, in addition to directors of JSLCs.  
 
This paper argues that the liquidation duty is relatively effective in creditor protection 
as it can deter debt evasion and compensate the creditors. Nevertheless, the liquidation 
duty allows individual creditor to enforce directly against directors or shareholders and 
thus might encourage a ‘race to the courthouse’ and bypass the equality of treatment 
norm in insolvency law. In addition, the liquidation duty may not adequately address 
moral hazard concerns in respect of directors and shareholders nor encourage early 
restructurings that maximise value for creditors, employees and other stakeholders. In 
the UK and other countries, there are reform efforts ongoing to facilitate restructuring 
for financially distressed companies. In light of the international experience, this paper 
makes the case for reforms to the current Chinese framework.  
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The second section sets the stage by 
addressing the main features of corporate governance and insolvency law in China 
including directors’ or shareholders’ duties to creditors. The third section analyses the 
development and application of the liquidation duty by the SPC, including a discussion 
of Guiding Case No.9. The fourth section examines the effectiveness of the liquidation 
duty in creditor protection. The fifth section examines critically, comparable rules in 




II. Setting the scene - Corporate Governance and Insolvency Law with Chinese 
characteristics 
 
A. Uniqueness of Chinese Corporate Governance and Insolvency Law  
 
Corporate governance in the US, UK and other Anglo-Saxon jurisdictions seemingly 
pursue two seemingly paradoxical aims---shareholder primacy and board primacy. 
Board primacy means that the decision-making power within the company is vested in 
the board of directors and even shareholders cannot interfere with the exercise of this 
power except in exceptional circumstances. The board can decide on the allocation of 
cash flows and the distribution of profits to shareholders.4 
 
The board however is bound to maximise shareholder wealth as required by the 
‘shareholder primacy’ principle. The notion of ‘shareholder primacy’ is something of a 
misnomer as shareholders do not have the primacy in decision-making connoted by this 
term and this decision-making right in fact resides with the board of directors. 
Shareholder primacy over other corporate constituencies can be better described as 
‘shareholder exclusivity’ in the sense that management decision-making is 
exclusively for the interests of the shareholders.5 Section 172 UK Companies Act 2006 
requires directors to have regard to stakeholder interests in fulfilling their duty to 
 
4 Marc T Moore, Corporate Governance in the Shadow of the State (Hart Publishing Limited 2013), p 
29. 
5 Ibid.  
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‘promote the successes of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole’. This 
section is aimed at ameliorating the side effects produced by the single-minded pursuit 
of shareholder value but it has not changed the general position in the UK corporate 
law. Since the board is running the business for the interests of the shareholders, a 
primary aim of corporate governance in both the UK and US is to address the agency 
problem between shareholders and the board. To hold the board of directors accountable 
to shareholders, fiduciary duties have been developed to constrain the discretion of the 
board.  
 
By way of contrast, Chinese company law has developed a shareholder-centred 
corporate governance regime with no clear authority given to the board. It appears from 
the legislation and relevant literature, that the objective of corporate governance is to 
maximise shareholder wealth and this objective has been used to justify State 
intervention when the State is the dominant shareholder. In small and medium sized 
companies where the management and shareholding overlap, the ‘shareholder primacy’ 
theory has been misinterprted to support the dominant role of controlling shareholders 
in the corporate decision-making. The board of directors usually lacks the independence 
or power to challenge the controlling shareholders.6 This has been confirmed by an 
empirical study, which has found that minority shareholder oppression is likely to occur 
in SOEs and other large companies. It is also uncommon for controlling shareholders 
 
6 Deng Feng, ‘The Role, Function and Theoretical Origins of Chinese Board [董事会制度的起源, 演
进与中国的学习]’ (2011) Chinese Social Sciences 164. 
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of small companies to abuse their power to harm the interests of minority shareholders.7 
 
By way of contrast, Chinese company law has developed a shareholder-centred 
corporate governance regime with no clear authority given to the board. It appears from 
the legislation and relevant literature, that the objective of corporate governance is to 
maximise shareholder wealth and this objective has been used to justify State 
intervention when the State is the dominant shareholder. In small and medium sized 
companies where the management and shareholding overlap, there is a tendency for the 
‘shareholder primacy’ theory to be interpreted as meaning that shareholders are the 
owners of the company and free to use company’s assets as they please. Controlling 
shareholders usually dominate corporate decision-making and the board of directors 
lack the independence or power to challenge the controlling shareholders. 8  To 
summarise, corporate governance in China has two main characteristics that distinguish 
it from the Anglo-American outsider model9 : (1) A concentrated shareholding (and 
concentrated debt) system; the separation of ownership from management is usually 
illusory and the main agency problem is controlling shareholder abuse, rather than 
board-shareholder conflict. (2) Excessive state control; government intervention and a 
substantial state ownership has brought about a hybrid model which has both 
 
7 Colin Hawes and others, ‘The Chinese “Oppression” Remedy: Creative Interpretations of Company 
Law by Chinese Courts’ (2015) 63 American Journal of Comparative Law 559. 
8 Deng Feng, ‘The Role, Function and Theoretical Origins of Chinese Board [董事会制度的起源, 演
进与中国的学习]’ (2011) Chinese Social Sciences 164. 
9 Mark J Roe, ‘Some Differences in Corporate Structure in Germany, Japan, and the United States’ (1993) 
102 Yale Law Journal 1927. 
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administrative and economic governance characteristics in China.10 
 
Previous comparative studies have often assumed that some models are more effective 
than the others and corporate governance and insolvency law across the world is 
evolving and converging towards the ‘best’ model.11 The highly influential Doing 
Business project of the World Bank also contains this assumption. By assigning scores 
to a jurisdiction based on evaluation of the formal law or law on the bookbooks, it 
encourages countries to adopt deregulation measures and change formal law in order to 
converge towards the US model.12  
 
For the past decades, China has carried out various deregulation reforms and imported 
many legal rules, most notably from the US. During the overhaul of company law at 
the end of 2013, the minimum legal capital requirement was removed13 and the annual 
 
10 Andrew Keay and Jingchen Zhao, ‘Transforming Corporate Governance in Chinese Corporations: A 
Journey, Not a Destination’ (2018) 38 Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business 187. 
11 For example, the ‘legal origins’ theory raised by LLSV has concluded that countries that adopted the 
common law performed better economically than those with a civil law origin. See  La Porta and others, 
‘The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins’ (2008) 46 Journal of Economic Literature 285. See also 
H Hansmann and R Kraakman, ‘The End of History for Corporate Law’ (2000) 89 Geo. LJ 439; David 
A Skeel Jr, ‘An Evolutionary Theory of Corporate Law and Corporate Bankruptcy’ (1998) 51 
Vanderbilt  L. Rev. 1323; John Armour, Brian R Cheffins and David A Skeel Jr, ‘Corporate Ownership 
Structure and the Evolution of Bankruptcy Law: Lessons from the United Kingdom’ (2002) 55 Vanderbilt 
L. Rev. 1699.  
12 Gerard McCormack, ‘Why “Doing Business” with the World Bank May Be Bad for You’ (2018) 19 
European Business Organization Law Review 649. 
13 The legal capital regime in China has been transformed from 'paid-up' capital into ‘subscribed’ capital. 
The minimum capital requirement has been removed and thus companies can determine the amount of 
registered capital and the time to pay the capital in their articles of association. As shareholders do not 
need to make a initial capital contribution to register a company, the requirement for verification of 
capital by the Industry and Commerce Administrative Bureau (ICAB) is also scrapped. See generally 
Company Law 2013, articles 7, 23, 25, 26, 27, 32. Also see Shuangge Wen and Jingchen Zhao, 
‘Contextualizing Legal Norms: A Multi-Dimensional View of the 2014 Legal Capital Reform in China’ 
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inspection system is replaced with an annual reporting system.14 Upon release of the 
Doing Business Report 2019, the press in China celebrated China's great leap from 78th 
to 46th in the league tables.15 In order to improve further the business environment, 
China is carrying out reforms to reduce the time for starting a business as well as 
speeding up the process of acquiring necessary licenses and enhancing the efficiency 
of litigation. 16  In terms of insolvency law, another notable effort to promote 
convergence and harmonisation is the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide to Insolvency 
Law,17 which has clearly influenced Chinese insolvency law.18  
 
The unique corporate governance model is likely to persist in China however, with  
 
(2018) 19 European Business Organization Law Review 93. 
14 The annual reports will disclose the total amount of paid-up capital, the capital subscription, paid-up 
capital of each shareholder, and the time limit on paying up the capital as specified by the articles of 
association. Authorities will choose a sample of companies to check the authenticity of the information 
provided by in the annual reports. See ibid.   
15  Tan Xinyu, ‘Doing Business in China Becomes Easier’ (Chinadaily, 30 November 2018) 
<http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201811/30/WS5c00d071a310eff30328c123.html> accessed 11 
December 2018. 
16 Liang Xiangbin, Kong Xiangxin and Gao Jianjun, ‘Beijing’s Business Environment Reform Was 
Recognized by the World Bank as &quot; Bank: Amazingly Fast and Effective [北京营商环境改革受
到 世 界 银 行 认 可 ： “ 令 人 惊 叹 的 快 速 且 有 效 ”]’ (Xinhua news, 2018) 
<https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/3UkfcZLGGzsdarnR4mXzJg> accessed 29 December 2018; Chu Xiumin, 
‘Interpretation of the Latest Policy of Optimizing Business Environment Reform in Shanghai Part IX: 
Handling Bankruptcy [ 上海优化营商环境改革最新政策解读之九：办理破产 ]’ (2018) 
<https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/3FJilBM68omG_tqZqwV70A> accessed 29 December 2018. 
17 See generally Susan Block-Lieb and Terence C. Halliday, 'Harmonization And Modernization In 
UNCITRAL's Legislative Guide On Insolvency Law' (Papers.ssrn.com, 2007) 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=965710#> accessed 23 August 2019. 
In recent years,  Working Group V (Insolvency Law) of the UNCITRAL has considered the shifting of 
directors' duties in some jurisdictions. See Part 4 (‘Directors’ Obligations in the Period Approaching 
Insolvency’) of UNCITRAL’s Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law (2013), available at 
www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/Leg-Guide-Insol-Part4-ebook-E.pdf. 
18 See Terence Charles Halliday and Bruce G Carruthers, Bankrupt: global lawmaking and systemic 
financial crisis (Stanford University Press 2009), p 394. 
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capital markets in the process of development, a powerful Communist Party and deep 
rooted traditions of State capitalism and top-down regulation.19 Because of entrenched 
differences between political and legal systems, legal transplants in the corporate 
governance sphere are often ineffective and fail to perform in the same way in the 
‘importing’ jurisdiction as they do in the ‘exporting’ jurisdiction.  For example, China 
has transplanted fiduciary duties of directors in order to constrain directorial discretion 
and protect shareholder interests, but these rules have not been effectively applied. This 
may be due to the fact that it is challenging for Chinese courts to apply discretionary 
rules (e.g. fiduciary duties) imported from common law jurisdictions because of 
insufficient knowledge, lack of authority and the absence of a system of binding 
precedent (stare decisis). 20  A more fundamental problem however, is that board-
centred liability rules are designed to address shareholder/board conflicts. Such rules 
are not capable of resolving abuses from majority shareholders or State intervention, 
which are the more striking issues for Chinese corporate governance. This illustrates 
the proposition that imported laws usually work less effectively than internally 
developed laws as they may not be compatible with the local circumstances.21  
 
Mismatches between law and reality can be also observed in Chinese insolvency law, 
which has largely remained as ‘law on the books’ during the past decade. China’s 
 
19 Wen and Zhao (n 10). 
20 Guangdong Xu and others, ‘Directors’ Duties in China’ (2013) 14 European Business Organization 
Law Review 57. 
21 Jan Torpman Jan and Fredrik Jörgensen, ‘Legal Effectiveness: Theoretical Developments Concerning 
Legal Transplants’ (2005) 91 Archiv für Rechts-und Socialphilosophie 515. 
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Enterprise Bankruptcy Law (EBL) 2006 incorporated many concepts from the 1978 US 
Bankruptcy Code and the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law. It 
introduces the idea of an external administrator being in charge of the bankruptcy 
procedure and contains advanced notions such as maximising creditor value and giving 
a second chance to failing businesses. Empirical research however, has found that most 
businesses failures in China are resolved without making use of the formal bankruptcy 
procedure and the procedure itself has featured significant State government 
intervention and certain outcomes that are arguably inefficient and unfair for 
creditors.22 
 
Some scholars have argued that Chinese insolvency law should emulate the US and 
adopt a debtor-in-possession (DIP) norm allowing management to stay in charge and 
thereby incentivizing them to make use of the formal procedure.23 Such suggestions 
however, have not considered the uniqueness of the corporate govnernance governance 
system in China. Rather than piggybacking on legal rules that are board-centred and 
reflect ‘board primacy’, future reform in China should concentrate on the issues thrown 
up by State intervention and the opportunism of controlling shareholders. Current 
application and enforcement of fiduciary duties in relation to controlling shareholders 
is highly inconsistent and problematic. These imported rules should be adapted to the 
 
22 Tomasic and Zhang (n 1). 
23 Xu Meizheng and Wang Zuofa, ‘Chinese Bankruptcy Law Needs to Be Improved [我国破产重整制
度 亟 待 完 善 ]’ (2016) <http://dz.jjckb.cn/www/pages/webpage2009/html/2016-
08/30/content_22975.htm> accessed 11 December 2018. 
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Chinese context and applied to the liability of majority shareholders and State 
shareholders.24 
 
In addition, if internally developed rules are available to be adjusted and modified, they 
might be better options than imported law as they are more responsive to the local 
demand and consistent with the political economy of the country. Internally developed 
rules are more familiar to local constituencies including local lawyers and judges. The 
liquidation duty, for example, is internally developed and has proved relatively 
effective in constraining shareholder opportunism and protecting creditors. Since 
the SPC published the Guiding Case No. 9 that confirmed the liquidation duty for 
minority shareholders of LLCs in 2012, the number of liquidation duty cases has 
increased significantly.25 Shangshang Liang, a leading scholar on Chinese corporate 
law even argues that the liquidation duty leads to the unbalanced situation where 
creditors are overprotected while the shareholders of the small and medium companies 
might be jointly liable for the company’s debts.26 But before analyzing this duty in 




25 Shangshang Liang, "Questioning the Status of Shareholders of LLCs as Liquidation Obligatee [有限
公司股东清算义务人地位质疑]" (2019) 2 China Legal Study. 
26 Ibid.  
27 It is worth noting that regulations promulgated by public regulators might be more important in 
determining the liability of directors and controlling shareholders in listed companies. Also, rules for 
Party members might contain main sanctions for directors in SOEs. These issues have already been 




B. Directors or shareholders’ duty to creditors under Chinese corporate and 
insolvency Law 
 
Under the EBL, a director shall bear civil liability according to law when her failure to 
comply with duties of loyalty and diligence leads to bankruptcy of a company. Such 
director will also be disqualified from serving as a director, supervisor or senior 
manager of any enterprise within three years from the date when the procedure for 
bankruptcy is terminated.28   
 
Chinese Company law also provides that directors may bear civil liability for causing 
damage to creditors when they breach their duties of loyalty and diligence.29 This 
provision however, is too vague to be enforceable since the Chinese judiciary is rather 
rigid in interpreting directors’ duties of loyalty and diligence.30 Therefore, it is unlikely 
that a creditor-regarding duty of directors will be developed by judicial interpretation. 
 
The EBL also provides that the legal representative31 of the debtor company and the 
 
Political Logic of Corporate Governance in China’s State-Owned Enterprises’ (2014) 47 Cornell 
International Law Journal. 
28 EBL 2006, article 125. 
29 Company Law 2013, articles 148-149. The duty of diligence is equivalent to the duty of care under 
common law. 
30 Xu and others (n 16). 
31 The legal representative under Chinese law is a person who represents the company to outsiders and 
has the power to bind the company. The role can be assumed by the executive director, the chairman of 
 
 14
person directly responsible are liable to pay compensation if the debtor company is 
responsible for an action or transaction detrimental to creditors that is void or 
voidable.32 What constitutes a void or voidable action or transaction is provided in 
Articles 31-33 of the EBL. The objective of these provisions is to prevent the 
concealment of assets and preferential payments to individual creditors through the 
nullifications of transactions and restoration of the company’s property. The provisions 
play a similar role to those on fraudulent transfertransfers, undervalue 
transactiontransactions, and preference preferences under UK and US insolvency law.33 
The imposition of personal liability in respect of void and voidable transactions is too 
general however, and in reality rarely used by creditors. Misbehaviour such as 
concealment and transfer of assets and preferential payments are usually challenged 
through a claim for breach of the liquidation duty.34  
 
The preceding analysis shows the difficulties in establishing and enforcing liability to 
creditors under Chinese insolvency law. The rules are vague and centred around the 
duty/liability of directors. The underlying assumption is that the board of directors is in 
charge of, and responsible for, opportunistic advantage-gaining at the expense of 
creditors. This assumption is inconsistent however, with the dominant position of 
 
the board of directors or manager of the company - see Company Law 2013, article 13. 
32 EBL 2006, article 128 
33 UK Insolvency Act 1986, ss 238 (fraudulent transfer), 239 (undervalue) & 423 (preference). US 
Bankruptcy Code s 547 (preferences), s 548 (fraudulent transfers and undervalue transactions 
(constructively fraudulent transfers).   
34 Xiao Xiong, ‘The Recast of Corporate Liquidator Centralism [论公司清算人中心主义的回归与重
建]’ (2017) Politics & Law 141. 
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controlling shareholders in Chinese companies. The formulation of the relevant 
provisions could be improved. In particular, given the ‘shareholder-centred’ model of 
corporate governance in China, they should impose liability on controlling shareholders. 
But even if these rules are better drafted, it is doubtful that they will be used by creditors 
as many companies in China cease to engage in commercial activities without going 
through the formal insolvency procedures. As such, insolvency law only plays a very 
limited role in creditor protection whereas important rules are mostly embedded in 
company law.  
 
The effectiveness of the liquidation duty is also disputable. The fact that many 
companies ceased trading without formal insolvency or orderly liquidation seems to 
suggest that the liquidation duty is not well observed and its deterrent effect is limited. 
However, the reason for this might be that shareholders of small companies are either 
unaware of the liquidation duty or bet on not being caught. As more cases are being 
enforced and reported, it is likely that the liquidation duty will become more effective 
in deterring shareholder abuse. This will be further analysed in the following sections.  
 
 
III. The liquidation duty under Chinese Law 
A. Origins and development of the liquidation duty  
 
In China, the expression ‘liquidation duty’ refers to an obligation to collect and then 
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distribute the assets of company to creditors and other claimants. To be specific, where 
reasons for terminating the existence of a company have arisen, a liquidation team 
should be formed within 15 days to carry out the task of liquidation.35 The failure to 
carry out the liquidation within a certain time or making it impossible for carry it out 
through concealment of assets etc. will result in joint and several liability. In LLCs, all 
shareholders are subject to the liquidation duty, while the liquidation duty only falls on 
the controlling shareholders and directors in JSLCs.36  
 
Under Chinese law, the liquidation duty is triggered once legal reasons for terminating 
the existence of a company (dissolution or Jiesan) have arisen and the company's legal 
personality comes to an end as a result of the liquidation process. In addition to 
insolvency, a company’s existence may also be brought to an end as a result of 
administrative dissolution (revocation of business license etc.), voluntary dissolution 
(dissolution by shareholders’ resolution etc.), and judicial dissolution demanded by 
shareholders.37 
 
In the past, liquidating a failed business in China was often triggered by revocation of 
business license by the administrative authority rather than a formal bankruptcy filing. 
 
35 Company Law 2013, article 183. Before the amendment in 2013, this provision was article 184 under 
Company Law 2005.  
36 Ibid.; also see Provisions of the Supreme People's Court on Some Issues about the Application of the 
Company Law (II), i.e. Judicial Interpretation II, articles 18-21. This will be further discussed below.  
37 Company Law 2013, article 180. Also see Wang Jiangyu, Company Law in China : Regulation of 
Business Organizations in a Socialist Market Economy (Edward Elgar Publishing 2014), p 339. 
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It is often difficult for companies to enter the bankruptcy procedure.38 The liquidation 
duty is an important complement to the bankruptcy law for it is not uncommon for a 
company’s assets to be transferred away by the directors and controlling shareholders 
leaving it without assets in its possession. The liquidation duty may be employed to 
combat this abuse and is relatively well used by creditors.39 A search of the keyword 
‘liquidation duty’ in Chinese Judgments Online40 from 2009 to 2018 results in an 
average of 857 cases per year. The number of cases related to ‘liquidation duty’ peaked 
in 2017 at 1,925 and may continue to rise with the increasing business failures under 
the current economic slowdown in China.  
 
 
38 But this has changed with recent governmental efforts to make greater use of formal bankruptcy 
procedures, particularly for zombie companies. See WR Lam and others, ‘Resolving China’s Zombies: 
Tackling Debt and Raising Productivity’ (2017) 
<https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2017/11/27/Resolving-China-Zombies-Tackling-
Debt-and-Raising-Productivity-45432> accessed 11 December 2018. 
39 For example, the report by Changzhou Intermediate Court of Jiangsu Province states:"...as long as 
evidence can prove a creditor-debtor relationship as well as the fact that the liquidation obligatees did 
not notify the creditor, it can be determined that there is a an illegal act of liquidation. As to the situation 
where the company's assets has been illegally disposed, the main issue is to determine the losses of 
creditors....Articles 31 and 33 of the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law also have similar provisions." Also, the 
report states that all of the 42 cases accepted by the court from 2008 to 2011 are filed by creditors against 
'liquidation obligatees' although in theory the company (represented by its directors or controlling 
shareholders) can raise a claim against wrongdoers as the company has suffered losses in the liquidation 
procedure. See Changzhou Intermediate Court, ‘On Practical Problems in Cases Regarding Liquidation 
Duty: Based on the Trial of Two-Tier Courts in Changzhou [不当履行清算义务案件审判实务若干问
题探析——以常州市两级法院的审理情况为研究基础]’ (2012) Law Application 61. 
 
Also, the judiciary in Wenzhou city, Zhejiang province reports a sharp rise in the number of liquidation 
duty cases from 11 in 2011 to 143 in 2015. The report points out that liquidation duty cases has have 
complemented the bankruptcy procedure and 'become a sharp weapon to combat evasion of debts'. In 
92.3% of 247 cases sampled by the report, the main circumstance for enforcing the liquidation duty is 
that the debtor company has no assets to distribute to creditors. Wenzhou Intermediate Court, 
‘Difficulties in Wenzhou Court’s Trial of Cases Regarding Shareholders’ Delay in Performing 
Liquidation Duty [温州法院审理股东怠于履行清算义务案件若干疑难问题梳理 ]’ (2017) Law 
Application 23. 




The liquidation duty was in fact created many years before the enactment of the first 
comprehensive corporate bankruptcy law in the EBL. It was developed by the SPC 
based on interpretations of the first modern company law in contemporary China -- 
Company Law 1993. This law provided for a mandatory ‘administrative liquidation’ 
conducted by the ‘department in charge’ (zhuguan danwei)41  when a company is 
ordered to close down for violating the law or regulations. 42  In 2001, the SPC 
confirmed through a reply43 to a lower court that the ‘department in charge’ would be 
liable for a company’s debts when it failed to put the company into liquidation after the 
revocation of its licence.44 Later local courts followed this approach to address the 
widespread problem of debt evasion. In this way, the liquidation duty for ‘department 
in charge’ has been established.45 
 
In 2005, the new company law was enacted, which scraps the ‘administrative 
liquidation’ provided under Company Law 1993 and shifts the liquidation duty from 
the ‘department in charge’ to shareholders and directors. To be specific, when a 
 
41 In the old days of the planned economy, every economic organisation is was a unit embedded in the 
administrative hierarchy and overseen by a ‘department in charge’. The legal status of shareholders was 
only formally recognised when Company Law was promulgated in 1993. 
42 Company Law 1993, article 192.  
43  The SPC can substitute lower courts’ decisions with its own ‘replies’ to local courts regarding 
individual cases, as illustrated by its reply to local courts regarding the liquidation duty. These replies 
are final in the sense that both the lower courts and the appellate courts have to comply with them. The 
replies have, in fact, nullified the right to appeal of litigants. They have also undermined the judicial 
independence and discretion of the lower courts. See Fengjing Liu, ‘The Definition and Exercise of 
Judicial Interpretation Authority [司法解释权限的界定与行使]’ (2016) 3 China Legal Science 207.  
44 Jiang Daxing, Company Law Report [公司法律报告] (CITIC Press 2003), p 425. 
45 Ibid., p 428.  
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company’s business license is revoked or it is ordered to close down for violating laws 
or regulations, its shareholders or directors have the duty to initiate liquidation, 46 
instead of the ‘department in charge’. 
 
The liability for breach of the liquidation duty is further specified in the judicial 
interpretation issued by the SPC in 2008 (hereafter Judicial Interpretation II). 47 It 
provides that all shareholders in LLCs are ‘liquidation obligatees’ while in the JSLCs, 
‘liquidation obligatees’ refer to controlling shareholders and directors. It also states that 
in the event of breaching the liquidation duty and making it impossible to carry out 
liquidation, ‘liquidation obligatees’ will be jointly and severally liable. Two provisions 
further detail the circumstances where joint and several liability arises. Article 18 (2) 
states that if ‘liquidation obligatees’48 fail to set up the liquidation team within 15 days, 
causing the loss of main assets and important documents of the company and therefore 
making it impossible to carry out a liquidation, the ‘liquidation obligatees’ will be 
jointly and severally liable for the debts of the company. Article 20 provides that if 
liquidation obligatees deregister the company without liquidating the company first 
(usually through the use of false documents), they will be liable for the debts of the 
company.  
 
46 Company Law 2005, article 184 
47  Provisions of the Supreme People's Court on Some Issues about the Application of the Company Law 
(II)(2008, revised in 2014), articles 18-21.  
48 Judicial Interpretation II does not use the expression-‘liquidation obligatees’ in the text, which is 
formally referred to for the first time in General Provisions of the Civil Code (2017). However, the term 




Judicial Interpretation II permits shareholders to apply for a judicial liquidation when a 
cause for dissolution arises. 49  It also provides that shareholders can claim a 
contribution or compensation from other shareholders, de facto controllers, directors, 
based on the extent of the latter’s fault, after the claimants have paid the creditors. 50 
The right to demand liquidation however, may not provide a sufficient safeguard for 
passive shareholders who are not aware that they face the choice of either demanding a 
judicial liquidation or being liable to creditors when the controlling shareholders fail to 
carry out a timely liquidation. It seems unfair that the burden falls on the minority 
shareholders to prove the fault of controlling shareholders before being able to recoup 
their payments to creditors.  
 
Nevertheless, the liability of minority shareholders in LLCs is confirmed by the No.9 
Guiding Case issued by the SPC in 2012. This case holds two minority shareholders 
jointly liable for the company’s debts because they breached their liquidation duty, 
despite their claim of not being involved in the management. In a subsequent case, the 
SPC clarified that unlimited liability for breaching the liquidation duty is based on 
article 20 (3) of Company Law 2005, which specifies the consequences of discarding 
the doctrine of corporate legal personality.  
 
 
49 Ibid., article 7 
50 Ibid., article 21 
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It is clear that the main objective of the liquidation duty is to address the problem of 
malicious debt evasion. In its further explanation of the No.9 Guiding Case, the SPC 
states that it is common for companies not to go into liquidation and some even use 
dissolution to escape debts, undermining the interests of creditors and endangering the 
order of the market economy. The liquidation duty aims to mitigate against such a 
phenomenon.  
 
The latest major development on the liquidation duty is the promulgation of the General 
Provisions of the Civil Law (Civil Law). In a 2015 conference on the drafting of the 
Civil Law, scholars were divided on whether minority shareholders should be exempted 
from the liquidation duty.51 The draft Civil Law promulgated by the Civil Law Council 
of the Standing Committee of National People’s Congress (NPC) largely replicated the 
provisions on joint liability of ‘liquidation obligatees’ from the Judicial Interpretation 
II. However, the official Civil Law enacted in 2017 provides that failure to fulfil the 
liquidation duty and consequent loss to creditors will result in civil liability without 
reference to ‘joint liability’. It also defines ‘liquidation obligatees’ as directors and 
members in the decision-making or executive bodies, without stating that all 
shareholders in LLCs are ‘liquidation obligatees’ as provided by the Judicial 
Interpretation II.52 The Civil Law, however, also clarifies that special legislation shall 
 
51 Civil Law Office of the Law Committee of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, 
Legislation Background and Discussions on General Provisions of the Civil Law [民法总则立法背景
与观点全集] (Law Press 2017), p 525-526. 
52 General provisions of the Civil Law, article 70 
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prevail in regard to the liquidation procedure and Company Law shall apply in the 
absence of other provisions.53 This means that the provisions on the liquidation duty 
in Company Law and Judicial Interpretation II continue to apply and minority 
shareholders of LLCs are still open to joint and several liability for breaching the 
liquidation duty.54  
 
The SPC has played an essential role in the development of the liquidation duty in 
China. By filling the gaps left by the statutes, the SPC has provided a pragmatic solution 
to the problem of debt evasion in China. Nevertheless, the expanding lawmaking power 
of the SPC gives rise to the concern that it has become a ‘quasi-legislator’ and thereby 
undermining the established order of rule-making in China. Some scholars even cite 
this as the emergence of ‘judicial activism’ in China.55 
 
The SPC in particular has been criticised for encroaching upon the legislative power of 
the National People’s Congress (NPC).56 The judicial interpretations are usually not 
based on the accumulation of individual cases, but formulated in accordance with the 
reading of the legislation by the SPC. The judicial interpretations sometimes deviate 
 
53 Ibid., article 71 
54  Wang Changhua, ‘On Definition of Liquidation Obligatee of Limited Liability Company: The 
Application of Article 70 of the General Principles of Civil Law in China [论有限责任公司清算义务
人的界定———以我国《民法总则》第 70 条的适用为分析视角]’ [2018] Law Science Journal 89  
55 Chenguang Wang, ‘Law-Making Functions of the Chinese Courts: Judicial Activism in a Country of 
Rapid Social Changes’ (2006) 1 Frontiers of Law in China 524. 
56 Chen Su, ‘Analysis of Constructing Concept of Judicial Interpretation [司法解释的建构理念分析]’ 
(2012) 2 Chinese Journal of Law. 
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from the legislative purpose and assert the SPC's own policies which find no basis in 
the ‘legislative spirit’. 57  Moreover, the SPC’s authority to clarify legislation is 
questionable as its judicial interpretation power is limited to ‘specific application of 
laws and decrees in court trials’. As to the clarification of the specific meaning of 
provisions or the application of the law in new circumstances, the SPC should only 
request the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPC) to issue a 
legislative interpretation.58   
 
Compared with judicial interpretations, the guiding case system established by the SPC 
in recent years may be more legitimate and sustainable.59 Since 2010, the SPC starts to 
issue guiding cases in order to improve the uniformity and consistency of adjudication 
among different levels of courts.60 For this purpose, the SPC has set up an Office for 
 
57 Ibid.  
58 Resolution of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress Providing an Improved 
Interpretation of the Law [全国人民代表大会常务委员会关于加强法律解释工作的决议](Adopted at 
the 19th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Fifth National People's Congress on June 10, 1981); 
Legislation Law 2000, articles 45 and 104.  
59 See Provisions on Case Guidance [关于案例指导工作的规定] (No. 51 [2010] of the Supreme 
People's Court); Detailed Rules for the Implementation of the Provisions on Case Guidance [关于案例
指导工作的规定实施细则] (No. 130 [2015] of the Supreme People's Court). 
60 Detailed Rules for the Implementation of the Provisions on Case Guidance, article 1. 
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Case Guidance Work61  to select typical cases62 that can offer guidance for future 
adjudications. It should be noted that the legal effect of guiding cases are fundamentally 
different from the binding precedents in common law as they are not an independent 
source of law and could only be cited as a reason for adjudication instead of the basis. 
 
Courts are required The guiding case system has injected an element of stare decisis into 
China's codified civil law system, however, it is doubtful to cite what extent it will fulfill 
the objective of unifying the application of the law.63 Most importantly, the guiding case 
in their adjudication although guiding cases distinguish from the binding precedents in 
common law as they are not explicitly binding on an independent source of law and could 
only be cited as a reason for adjudication instead of the local courtsbasis.64 In addition, 
guiding cases have been selected and edited by the SPC but not directly adjudicated by 
the SPC. For example, guiding case No.9 - the case clarifying the liquidation duty - was 
adjudicated by a court in Shanghai and then published by the SPC. Cases adjudicated 
by the SPC are not binding on the local courts. Local courts however, are very likely to 
consult these cases to assist their judgments; they are indicative of the general trajectory 
 
61 Ibid., article 3.  
62 Ibid., article 2.  
63 See JA Cohen, “Chinese Common Law? Guiding Cases and Judicial Reform.” (2016) 129 Harvard 
Law Review 2213; Mei Gechlik Stanford Law School China Guiding Cases Project, “China’s Guiding 
Cases System: Review and Recommendations  ” (August 2016) <https://cgc.law.stanford.edu/guiding-
cases-analytics/issue-5/> accessed February 6, 2018. 
64 Ibid.Detailed Rules for the Implementation of the Provisions on Case Guidance, articles 9 and10. 
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of the judicial approach. The next section will discuss guiding case No.9 and some 
cases adjudicated by the SPC that deal with the liquidation duty.  
 
B. Guiding Case No.9 and SPC Cases on the liquidation duty  
 
In Shanghai Cunliang Commercial Co., Ltd v Jiang Weidong & Wang Weiming, 
(Guiding Case No.9) the SPC clarified that all LLC shareholders are subject to the 
liquidation duty and can be held liable for the company’s debts despite not being 
involved in the management of the company.65  In this case, Cunliang was owed 
payments for steel delivered to Tuoheng. Cunliang sued the shareholders of Tuoheng 
for not putting the company into liquidation in time after its business license was 
revoked for failure to accomplish its annual inspection on time. The court found that 
the Tuoheng shareholders were subject to the liquidation duty and their delay caused 
the loss of the main assets and financial accounts of the company, making it impossible 
to liquidate the company; therefore, they should be jointly liable for the debts of the 
company. The court also rejected the minority shareholder claim that they were not 
involved in the management of Tuoheng on the ground that Tuoheng was a LLC 
whereby its shareholders as a whole are the ‘liquidation obligatees’ under company law. 
All of them have the duty to liquidate the company in time regardless of the extent of 
their shareholding and involvement in management. The minority shareholder also 
 
65 Guiding Cases of the SPC have been translated by the Standford Stanford Law School Chinese 




argued that the company had already depleted its assets before the revocation of the 
business license. While this was dismissed by the SPC, it hinted indicated that 
shareholders could defend themselves by arguing that there was a lack of causal link 
between the breach of liquidation duty and the company’s loss of assets.  
 
Guiding Case No.9 has effectively imposed strict liability on shareholders in LLCs as 
they cannot defend themselves on the basis of an absence of fault or lack of involvement 
in the management. In Shanghai Fengrui Investment Consulting Co., Ltd. vs. Shanghai 
Automotive Industry Sales Co., Ltd,66 however, the SPC seems to have corrected this 
position by holding that a shareholder may not be liable for creditor losses where such 
losses cannot be attributed to any fault on the part of the shareholder. In this case, after 
the license of an LLC was revoked, a creditor sought to hold two shareholders liable 
for the company’s debts because of their failure to put the LLC into liquidation. As one 
shareholder (hereafter company A) had also lost its business licence and ceased trading, 
the focus turned on the other shareholder (hereafter company B). The creditor argued 
that all LLC shareholders had the duty to liquidate the company despite not being 
involved in management, citing Guiding Case No.9.  
 
The SPC asserted that the basis for the liquidation duty was ‘disregarding legal 
personality’ (equivalent to piercing the corporate veil) and general theories of tort law 
liability. In establishing liability, three factors need to be satisfied including: first, 
 
66 SPC MinZai No.37 (2016) 
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liquidation obligatees failed to carry out the liquidation in time or did so inappropriately; 
second, their negligence or wrongdoing caused direct losses to creditors; third, a causal 
link could be established between breach of the liquidation duty and the creditors’ 
losses. On such basis, the SPC found that company B was not liable. It had extended 
loans to the LLC and applied for judicial enforcement of the debt. It also made efforts 
to trace the assets of the LLC. There was no causal link between the action of company 
B and the loss by the LLC of main assets. The SPC also said that the LLC’s license was 
revoked in 2001 when cases on the liquidation duty were still rare. While the principles 
laid down by the Judicial Interpretation II should apply retrospectively, it was unfair to 
impose joint liability when company B had made considerable efforts but was still 
unable to recover its own debts owed by the LLC.  
 
Some commentators have viewed this case as a move towards a laxer judicial approach 
on the liquidation duty.67 However, this case is not a guiding case and therefore it 
cannot change the general approach of the judiciary. SPC’s leniency in this case is fact-
specific in that the shareholder was also a creditor of the company and it seems unfair 
to impose liability on the shareholder when it cannot recover its own debts. In recent 
cases, the SPC has pointed out that shareholders of LLCs still bear ‘strict liability’ for 
breaching their liquidation duty. For example, in Zhang Weizhong v Laiying Asset 
Management Co., Ltd.68, a shareholder was held liable for the company’s debts despite 
 
67 Xiong (n 28). 
68 SPC MinShen No.808 (2017) 
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claiming that the company was placed in the custody of an investment company through 
contractual arrangement when the company’s business license was revoked and that an 
impostor had used his identification to register as a shareholder. The SPC found that 
the shareholder could not prove that his identity was stolen and as a shareholder, he had 
failed to fulfill his capital commitment to the company. He had also reached an 
agreement with some creditors to pay them before others.  
 
In general, the SPC has adopted a formal and rigid application of the liquidation duty. 
Under the Judicial Interpretation II, a LLC is presumed to be a ‘quasi-partnership’ in 
which all shareholders are closely involved in the business in contrast to the JSLC 
where there is greater involvement by a board of directors. The liquidation duty is 
imposed on all shareholders in LLCs. Guiding Case No.9 has confirmed the liability of 
passive shareholders in LLCs and the SPC has largely insisted on this approach, even 
though in reality there are many passive investors in LLCs, especially when they are 
used as vehicles for venture capital and private equitiesequity funds.  
 
For example, in 2014, a venture capital company based in Shenzhen was held liable for 
the debts of a LLC, in its capacity as a minority shareholder, on the ground that it failed 
to put the company into liquidation in time after the company’s business license was 
revoked, following an annual inspection by the local governmental authority. The 
venture capital company claimed that it was not involved in the management and the 
controlling shareholder had taken away the LLC’s financial accounts, main assets and 
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documents. Despite this, the venture capital company was still held liable for the LLC 
debts, with its bank accounts frozen and offices closed by the court.69 It is a common 
strategy for Chinese venture capital companies to diversify their investments by holding 
shares in a variety of LLCs while not being involved in the daily running of the business. 
The liquidation obligation has undermined such a strategy and may have chilling effects 
on venture capital investments.  
 
In a wordthe light of the discussion above, it is necessary for the courts to consider 
business substance and develop exceptions when some shareholders actually have no 
control over the business or there is no causal link between failure of discharging the 
liquidation duty and the loss of assets. This will be further considered in the next section, 
which provides a theoretical discussion on the effectiveness of the liquidation duty.  
 
IV. Effectiveness of the liquidation duty in creditor protection  
 
A. Effectiveness of the liquidation duty as a private enforcement mechanism 
If law is viewed as a tool for social engineering, i.e. regulating or shaping behaviour, 
then the effectiveness of the law must be measured by the extent to which it fulfils its 
objectives. Based on the objectives, law can be divided into preventive or curative. A 
preventive law is effective only if it could deter undesirable behaviour and prevent 
wrongs from happening. In contrast, a curative law must remedy a wrong ex post facto 
 
69  Liao Jiehua, ‘A Dangerous Precedent[ 危 险 的 判 例  Weixian De Panli]’ (February 2014) 
<http://www.eeo.com.cn/2014/0127/255576.shtml> accessed 26 December 2018. 
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and compensate the wronged party.70  
 
The liquidation duty is designed to perform both objectives by constraining debt 
evasion and protecting creditors. Therefore, the effectiveness of the liquidation duty 
should be measured based on both preventive and curative standards. It should offer a 
credible threat that wrongdoers will be punished and thereby deter directors and 
controlling shareholders from causing losses to creditors. It should also contain a 
credible commitment to compensating the creditors who have suffered losses.  
 
Measured by such standards, the liquidation duty is relatively effective and can 
ameliorate the agency problem between creditors and directors/shareholders. Breaching 
the liquidation duty will result in a joint and several liability on shareholders in LLCs 
and directors/controlling shareholders in JSLCs. They owe a tort liability to creditors, 
which is an exception to the limited liability rule. Under general tort law, joint and 
several liability applies in cases where the plaintiff’s loss is attributable to multiple 
parties. The plaintiff can litigate against any of the tortfeasors and recover full damages 
from the defendant. 71  As any of the potential tortfeasors is are regarded as fully 
accountable, they have the incentive to take measures to avoid liability. Therefore, joint 
and several liability appears more effective than proportionate liability in deterring 
 
70 Antony Allott, ‘The Effectiveness of Law’ (1980) 15 Val. UL Rev. 
71 Lewis A Kornhauser and Richard L Revesz, ‘Joint and Several Liability’ in De Gerrit Geest (ed), 






This reasoning can apply to the liquidation duty which incentivises 
shareholders/directors to avoid conducts that cause loss to creditors. If each defendant 
is only liable for a share of damages (proportionate liability), they might lack the 
incentive to monitor each other and take effective measures to preserve assets and 
documents that are necessary for liquidation. A proportionate liability scheme requires 
the plaintiff to sue all the defendants in order to recover ‘full’ damages. As ‘outsiders’, 
creditors are shielded by the corporate veil and are unlikely to know the financial status 
of each defendant and their share of liability for the delay or misbehavior misbehaviour 
in the liquidation. Given the informational disadvantages of creditors, it is fair to shift 
burden and risk to directors and shareholders for monitoring each other.  
 
In addition, joint and several liability for breaching the liquidation duty is effective in 
compensating the creditors since the shareholders/directors must pay the plaintiff first 
before they apportion the damages among themselves according to their share of fault. 
If one of them is insolvent or disappears, the rest of the ‘liquidation obligatees’ rather 




72 Law Commission of Ontario, ‘Joint and Several Liability Final Report’ (2011) <https://www.lco-
cdo.org/en/our-current-projects/joint-several-liability/joint-and-several-liability-final-report-february-
2011/vi-advantages-and-disadvantages-of-joint-and-several-liability/> accessed 26 December 2018. 
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Moreover, the liquidation duty has provided a private enforcement mechanism for 
creditors in addition to the formal and collective bankruptcy procedure. China has 
already made numerous deregulation efforts in the corporate and financial sector 
including the removal of the minimum legal capital requirement and the annual 
inspection system for companies. These measures are aimed at encouraging and 
facilitating private ordering by market forces. With less public regulatory rules for 
creditor protection, creditors have incentives to enforce the liquidation duty so as to 
protect their own interests. 
 
In countries such as China that have ‘incomplete’ law and a far from robust judiciary, 
public regulation usually plays a more important role than private enforcement. 
Compared with judges who are reactive, regulators are proactive enforcers. 73 
Regulators also have more expertise and political incentive to sanction socially 
undesirable behavioursbehaviour. For example, the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC) has played a dominant role in enforcing securities laws and 
fiduciary duties of directors in listed companies.  
 
Relying solely on public regulation however, can be problematic. Regulators may, for 
example, be ‘captured’ by the sectors they regulate. Rather than correcting market 
failures, regulation can be used to create barriers to competition and ‘rent seeking 
 
73 Chenggang Xu and Katharina Pistor, ‘Law Enforcement under Incomplete Law: Theory and Evidence 




behaviour’.74 It has been found that there is serious regulatory capture problem among 
regulators in China. The power of a financial regulator is proportional to the degree of 
corruption.75 Public regulation has also been criticised for imposing too many ex ante 
controls in China, whereas ex post enforcement is poor.76 Most pertinently, excessive 
ex ante control and heavy State intervention have undermined the accessibility and 
effectiveness of insolvency law in China.77 
 
Private enforcement is indispensable for a country that seeks to develop a ‘market 
economy’. For some scholars, private enforcement is even more important than public 
enforcement in the development of the financial market in a country. For instance, a 
major strand in the ‘law and finance’ literature has argued that private enforcement can 
facilitate the development of stock markets.78 The World Bank Doing Business Report 
has adopted this reasoning and promotes private enforcement and deregulation over 
public regulation.79  
 
74 George J Stigler, ‘The Theory of Economic Regulation’ (1971) 2 The Bell Journal of Economics and 
Management Science 3; Christopher Carrigan and Cary Coglianese, ‘Capturing Regulatory Reality: 
Stigler’s the Theory of Economic Regulation (U of Penn, Inst for Law & Econ Research Paper No. 16-
15)’ (2016) <http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2805153>. 
75 Some scholars have found that the power of a financial regulator is proportional to the degree of corruption, but 
this is gradually changing with the deregulatory reforms in China. Xie Ping and Lu Lei, Economic Analysis on 
Financial Corruption in China [中国金融腐败的经济学分析] (Ping Xie and Lei Lu eds, CITIC Press 
2005). 
76 Fang Zhang and Xiang Li, ‘Empirical Analysis of the Regulatory Intensity of the CSRC [对证监会
执法强度的实证分析]’ (2016) 38 Modern Law Science 173 (questioning the ‘regulatory intensity’ of 
the CSRC and arguing that its enforcement is weak, particularly when imposing the sanctions against 
directors and supervisors in listed companies). 
77 Tomasic and Zhang (n 1). 
78 Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes and Andrei Shleifer, ‘What Works in Securities Laws?’ 
(2006) 61 The Journal of Finance 1. 




As a private enforcement mechanism, the liquidation duty can complement public 
regulation in three ways: first, it constitutes an additional deterrence to misbehaviour 
of directors and shareholders; second, it can provide compensation for claimants who 
cannot be compensated through public sanctions; third, as creditors are more capable 
of protecting themselves through private enforcement, there will be less need for public 
regulation and unnecessary ex ante control.  
 
Compared with imported laws such as directors’ duty to creditors, the liquidation duty 
is more compatible with the legal and institutional environment of the country. It has 
been formed gradually by the SPC through judicial interpretation and the Guiding Case, 
instead of being inserted in the statute. Chinese lawyers and judges are already familiar 
with the liquidation duty and are more likely to rely on it. Law is a cognitive institution 
and its effectiveness therefore depends on whether it can be understood and embraced 
by users of law.80 In practice, the liquidation duty has been found to be relatively 
effectively used by creditors.81 
 
B. Criticisms of the liquidation duty in practice 
 
European Business Organization Law Review 649. 
80 Thomas W Waelde and James L Gunderson, ‘Legislative Reform in Transition Economies: Western 
Transplants—A Short-Cut to Social Market Economy Status?’ (1994) 43 International & Comparative 
Law Quarterly 347; Jacques deLisle, ‘Lex Americana:  United States Legal Assistance, American Legal 
Models, and Legal Change in the Post-Communist World and Beyond’ (1999) 20 University of 
Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law. 
81 See above (n 32). 
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It should be noted, however, that the current judicial interpretation and application of 
the liquidation duty may ‘over-deter’ by exposing shareholders and directors to 
disproportionate liability, especially minority shareholders in LLCs. As Chinese 
companies are usually dominated by majority shareholders, minority shareholders are 
excluded from the decision-making. The report of the judiciary in the city of Wenzhou 
finds that it is usual for minority shareholders in LLCs to raise invalid defences such as 
only having a small shareholding, not being involved in the management or not being 
in charge of the company's financial documents. The report also admits however, that 
it is unfair and can undermine investments to impose the same extent of liquidation 
duty on majority and minority shareholders in small and medium companies.82 
 
Imposing liability on passive shareholders also seems intuitively unfair because it 
contradicts the principle that punishment must be proportionate to the culpability and 
one must only be responsible for one’s own wrong.  The approach is inconsistent with 
the principles of the rule of law and is reminiscent of the Baojia system in China that 
lasted from the Song dynasty (960–1279) to the early twentieth century, under which 
‘the legal consequences of individual criminal behaviour often became the shared 
responsibility of family members who then had collectively to bear the brunt of the 
state’s insistence on morality and public order. ’83 
 
 
82 Wenzhou Intermediate Court (n 33). 
83 Ronald Keith and Zhiqiu Lin, New Crime in China (Routledge 2005), p 64. 
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In comparison, the allocation of the liquidation duty to controlling shareholders and 
directors in JSLCs is more consistent with their access to information and power in the 
corporate governance. Although JSLCs are subject to more demanding reporting 
requirements, including the obligation to provide minutes of relevant meetings; 
financial and accounting reports84 and the information disclosure requirements in the 
governance code for listed companies, information asymmetries still exist between 
minority shareholders and corporate controllers, as well as between creditors and 
corporate insiders. Controlling shareholders and directors are familiar with the 
operations and financial conditions of the company and have control over the 
company’s assets and financial books. Moreover, controlling shareholders can use their 
voting rights to dominate the governance decisions including those on liquidation and 
asset distributions. It is legitimate and necessary to require them to put the company 
into liquidation in time.  
  
In the future, it might be reasonable for the courts to exonerate defendants upon 
evidence that he or she has no control of the business or there is no causal link between 
delay in conducting liquidation and the company’s loss of assets. Without safeguards 
and excusing circumstances, the liquidation duty might create perverse incentives on 
shareholders to run away instead of being dragged into the court, while those who stay 
will be responsible.  
 




In addition, under Anglo-American systems, claims to reverse pre-insolvency 
transactions such as the payment of one creditor ahead of others in the same category - 
‘preferential payments’ - are enforced by the insolvency administrator. Creditor claims 
are also resolved collectively under the principle of ‘pari passu’ which requires that 
unsecured creditors shall be treated equally. This means that unsecured creditors receive 
the distribution of any available assets and bear losses in proportion to the amount of 
their debts. This principle however, can be circumvented in certain circumstances.85 
 
The In addition, the liquidation duty, on the other hand, allows individual creditors to 
enforce directly against directors and shareholders. This may encourage a ‘race to the 
courthouse’ and bypass the ‘pari passu’ principle of insolvency law, which requires that 
unsecured creditors shall be treated equally. Since liability for breaching This means 
that unsecured creditors receive the distribution of any available assets and bear losses 
in proportion to the amount of their debts.86 Under the Anglo-American system, the 
‘pari passu’ principle is safeguarded by the insolvency administrator, who can bring 
claims to reverse pre-insolvency transactions such as the payment of one creditor ahead 
of others in the same category - ‘preferential payments’. As discussed above, similar 
 
85 For an account of the pari passu principle see Lord Collins in Belmont Park Investments v BNY 
Corporate Trustee Services Ltd [2012] 1 AC 383. But for criticism of the fundamentality of the pari 
passu principle see Rizwaan Jameel Mokal, ‘Priority as Pathology: The Pari Passu Myth’ (2001) 60 
Cambridge Law 581.  
86 This principle however, can be circumvented in certain circumstances. For an account of the pari 
passu principle see Lord Collins in Belmont Park Investments v BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd 
[2012] 1 AC 383. But for criticism of the fundamentality of the pari passu principle see Rizwaan Jameel 
Mokal, ‘Priority as Pathology: The Pari Passu Myth’ (2001) 60 Cambridge Law 581.  
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provisions on pre-insolvency transactions also exist in Chinese insolvency law but are 
less enforced than the liquidation duty.87  
  
Based on the discussion above, the liquidation duty actually nullifies limited liability 
and separate legal personality, a  and contravenes the equal treatment of creditors in 
the same class. A balanced consideration of the interests of shareholders and creditors 
requires that the liquidation duty should be used as a last resort by creditors after they 
cannot enforce their claims through insolvency law.  
 
5. International comparisons - directors’ duty to creditors in insolvency and 
wrongful trading 
A. Creditor regarding duty of directors 
It is a clearly established rule under Anglo-American law that directors must exercise 
the powers given by company law as fiduciaries for the company as a whole and not 
for any collateral purpose.88 UK case law has established that the focus of directors’ 
duty to the company shifts from shareholders as a whole to creditors in the vicinity of 
insolvency.89 This to a certain extent also reflects the position in some states in the US 
 
87 See above note (26) and accompanying texts.  
88 Re Smith & Fawcett Ltd [1942] Ch 304 at 306; [1942] 1 All ER 542 at 543 and for relevant US case 
law see Harff v Kerkonian, 324 A.2d 215 (Del. Ch. 1974), rev’d in part on other grounds, 347 A.2d 133 
(Del. 1975); Aronson v Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984); Smith v Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 875-
73 (Del. 1985); Revlon Inc. v MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986); Katz v 
Oak Industries Inc., 508 A.2d 873 (Del. Ch. 1986); Geyer v Ingersoll Publ’ns Co., 621 A.2d 784 (Del. 
Ch. 1992); Re Amcast Indus. Corp., 365 B.R. 91 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2007).  
89 West Mercia Safetywear v Dodd [1988] BCC 30; Kuwait Asia Bank EC v National Mutual Life 
Nominees Ltd [1991] 1 AC 187; Yukong Lines Ltd of Korea v Rendsburg Investments Corpration of 
Liberia (No 2) [1998] 4 All ER 82;Stone & Rolls Ltd (in liq) v Moore Stephens (a firm) [2009] 4 All ER 
431; Bilta (UK) Ltd (in liq) v Nazir [2013] 1 All ER 375.  
 
 39
where US. Most notably, the influential Delaware Court of Chancery has held that ‘[a]t 
least where a corporation is operating in the vicinity of insolvency, a board of directors 
is not merely the agent of the residue risk bearers (i.e. the shareholders) but owes its 
duty to the corporate enterprise (i.e. primarily the creditors)’.90 
 
The creditor regarding duty is justified on the ground that creditors will replace 
shareholders as the residual claimants of the company’s value once the company 
becomes insolvent. Therefore, to constrain directors’ incentive to take excessive risks, 
directors should be required to consider the creditor interests when the company is 
insolvent or approaching insolvency.91 
 
In the UK, the relevant case law can be traced back to West Mercia Safetywear v 
Dodd,92 where a director of a company authorised the payment of a debt owed to its 
parent company. The defendant was also a director of the parent company and both 
companies were insolvent. The payment has been used to discharge the debt owed by 
the parent company to the bank, which was guaranteed by the director.  In addition to 
discouraging excessive risk taking, the West Mercia rule has also been regarded as a 
 
90 Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v Pathe Communications Corp., No. 12150, 1991 WL 277613 
(Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991). For discussion see Gregory V. Varollo and Jesse A Finkelstein, ‘Fiduciary 
Obligations of Directors of the Financially Troubled Company’ (1992) 48 Business Lawyer; Jonathan C 
Lipson, ‘Directors’ Duties to Creditors: Power Imbalance and the Financially Distressed Corporation’ 
(2002) 50 UCLA Law Review; Cory Dean Kandestin, ‘Duty to Creditors in Near-Insolvent Firms: 
Eliminating the Near-Insolvency Distinction’ (2007) 60 Vanderbilt Law Review; J William Callison, 
‘Why a Fiduciary Duty Shift to Creditors of Insolvent Business Entities Is Incorrect as a Matter of Theory 
and Practice’ (2006) 1 Journal of Business & Technology Law. 
91 Andrew Keay, ‘Directors’ Duties to Creditors: Contractarian Concerns Relating to Efficiency and 
Over-Protection of Creditors’ (2003) 66 Modern Law Review 665. 
92 8 (1988) 4 B.C .C. 30. 
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complement to the preference action93 which prevents one creditor from receiving a 
payment in contravention of the pari passu rule.94  
 
The duty is owed by directors indirectly to creditors as part of their fiduciary duty to 
act in the interests of the company and can only be enforced by the company (usually 
an insolvency practitioner on behalf of the company). 95  Professor Prentice has 
advanced three strong reasons for this position: ‘it eliminates any problems of double 
recovery; it preserves the pari passu principle in insolvency law and thirdly, it maintains 
the procedural monopoly of liquidation proceedings for handling the claims of creditors 
against an insolvent company’.96 This will require the liquidator when a company 
enters insolvency proceedings to undertake action to enforce the duties on behalf of the 
company as a whole. If the duties were direct, then every single creditor could claim 
for compensation from directors directly.  
 
It is clear that the creditor regarding duty of directors is triggered when the company is 
insolvent.97 When the companies are in the vicinity of insolvency, directors should 
monitor the company’s position to ascertain whether the company will remain solvent 
 
93 IA 1986, section 239. 
94 For a development of this line of reasoning see Kristin van Zweiten, ‘Director Liability in Insolvency 
and Its Vicinity’ (2018) 38 OJLS 382. 
95 However, in the US corporate creditors have been permitted to bring derivative actions on behalf of 
the company. Andrew R Keay, Company Directors' Responsibilities to Creditors, (Routledge, 2007), 274. 
96 D.D. Prentice, ‘Creditor’s Interests and Director’s Duties’ (1990) 10 OJLS 265 at 276. 
97 For Instance, see Re Pantone 485, Ltd [2002] 1 BCLC 266 at 285. 
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after the contemplated action is carried out.98 Nourse LJ also said in Brady v Brady99 
that ‘where a company is even doubtfully solvent ‘the interests of the company are in 
reality the interests of the existing creditors alone.’100 Similar ideas are expressed in 
other leading cases101 which confirm directors’ duties to creditors where a company is 
in ‘doubtful insolvency’. Nevertheless, the ‘doubtful insolvency’ trigger is far from 
being precise. The stage . In a recent case, BTI 2014 LLC v Sequana SA, the Court of 
doubtful solvency Appeal states that the creditor regarding duty arises when the 
‘directors know or should know that the company is far broader than insolvency and it 
would or is likely to become insolvent’.102 This at least confirmed that the directors’ 
creditor-regarding duty under the common law could be a very difficult to define what 
constitutes doubtful solvencytriggered before the company falls into actual insolvency.  
 
Section 172 UK Companies Act 2006 imposes on directors a statutory duty to consider 
the interests of creditors as part of the duty to promote the success of the company for 
the benefit of its shareholders (members) as a whole. There is explicit inclusion of 
various stakeholder including employees as internal stakeholders; creditors, suppliers 
and customers (as the primary external stakeholders), and local communities, 
environment and the media (as secondary external stakeholders). Section 172 is also 
 
98 Andrew R Keay, Company Directors’ Responsibilities to Creditors (Routledge-Cavendish 2007), p 
206. 
99 [1988] 3 BCC 533. 
100 Ibid., at 552. 
101 Nicholson v Permakraft (NZ) Ltd [1985] 3 ACLC 453 at 459, 463, 464; Re Hoursley & Weight Ltd 
[1982] 1 Ch 442 at 455; Geyer v Ingersoll Publications Co 621 A 2d 784. 
102 [2019] EWCA Civ 112, at para 220 (see the statement by David Richards LJ). 
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stated to be ‘subject to any enactment or rule of law requiring directors, in certain 
circumstances, to consider or act in the interests of creditors of the company’. 
 
B. The wrongful trading remedy in the UK  
Under the UK Insolvency Act 1986 when a company becomes insolvent, if directors 
act to the detriment of the company's creditors, they can also be held liable for 
malfeasance (s.212), fraudulent trading (s.213) and wrongful trading (s.214). Moreover, 
a person liable for wrongful trading, fraudulent trading and misfeasance can be the 
subject of a disqualification order of between 2 and 15 years at the discretion of the 
court.103 To be specific, section 212 provides that if directors have misappropriated the 
company's assets for their own benefits (malfeasance), they can be ordered by the court 
to contribute to the company's assets as the court thinks just. Section 213 states that if 
in the course of a winding up or administration of a company, it appears that any 
business of the company has been carried on with the intent to defraud creditors, the 
liquidator or administrator can apply to the court to obtain a contribution from anyone 
who was knowingly party (not just directors) to the fraudulent business. As the intention 




103 Under section 6 of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 (CDDA 1986) (as amended by 
the Insolvency Act 2000), a director of an insolvent company can be disqualified by the court if his 
conducts conduct makes him unfit in the management of the company.  
104 Re Patrick v Lyon Ltd [1933] Ch 786; Goldfarb v Higgins [2010] EWHC 613 (Ch). See Keay (n 71), 
p 122.  
 
 43
The wrongful trading rule stated in s 214105 provides that where directors knew or 
ought to have concluded that there was no reasonable prospect of the company avoiding 
insolvent liquidation or administration, they should take ‘every step with a view to 
minimising the potential loss to the company’s creditors’. The result of failure to 
comply with this provision is a contribution set by the courts. Courts have wide 
discretion as to the amount of compensation, but the contribution is usually 
compensatory in the sense that the amount is the difference between the value of the 
assets of the company at the date of a hypothetical liquidation when the company should 
have ceased trading and their value at the actual date of liquidation.106  
 
The Cork Committee on Insolvency Law, in proposing the wrongful trading provision, 
states that the provision is intended to ‘strike a balance between encouraging the 
inception and growth of business and creating a climate in which downright 
irresponsibility is discouraged and those who abuse the privilege of limited liability can 
be made personally liable for the consequences of their conduct’. 107  Further, as 
directors of thinly-capitalised companies are liable to be caught by the wrongful trading 
provision, this provision will encourage directors to ensure the adequate capitalisation 
of a company thereby compensating for the absence of a paid-in minimum share capital 
 
105 IA 1986 s 214 (liquidation); s 246ZB (administration), introduced by the Small Business, Enterprise 
and Employment Act 2015.  It should be noted that there is no statutory equivalent to the wrongful 
trading rule in the US Bankruptcy Code. 
106 Re produce marketing consortium [1989] (No 2) 5 BCC 569; Brooks and another (Joint Liquidators 
of Robin Hood Centre plc in liquidation) v Armstrong and another [2016] EWHC 2893.  
107 Insolvency Law Review Committee Chaired by Sir Kenneth Cork, Insolvency Law and Practice: 
Report of the Review Committee (Cmnd 8558) (London: HMSO 1982), at para 1805. 
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regime in the UK.108  
 
The trigger of directors’ duty under the wrongful trading provision is when there is no 
reasonable prospect of avoiding an insolvent liquidation, a point earlier than the onset 
of formal insolvency procedures. The insolvency procedure is only a condition of 
bringing actions for wrongful trading.109 In a majority of reported cases, the UK courts 
have adopted a ‘cash flow’ test, instead of a ‘balance sheet’ test to determine whether 
there is no reasonable prospect of avoiding an insolvent liquidation.110 The duty will 
only arise when the company cannot pay its debts as they fall due and the mere fact that 
the company’s debts exceed its assets will not trigger the duty.111 This is justified as 
many companies that are operating with large debts are still viable and directors are still 
incentivised to maximise the value of the company rather than gamble with it.  
 
Moreover, even if directors cease trading immediately after they are aware that there is 
no reasonable prospect of the company avoiding insolvency liquidation, they still can 
be held liable if they fail to take necessary steps to reduce losses to creditors. Behaviour 
of this type includes failure to collect the company’s debts, failure to preserve assets, 
 
108 Ibid., at para 1785. 
109 Paul Davies, ‘Creditor-Regarding Duties in Respect of Trading Decisions Taken in the Vicinity of 
Insolvency’ (2006) 7 European Business Organization Law Review 305. 
110 Re Purpoint Ltd [1991] B.C.C. 121; Re Rod Gunner Organisation [2004] B.C.L.C. 110. See also 
Thomas Bachner, ‘Wrongful Trading before the English High Court’ (2004) 5 European Business 
Organization L. Rev. 195; Peter O Mülbert, ‘A Synthetic View of Different Concepts of Creditor 
Protection: A High Level Framework for Corporate Creditor Protection’ (2006) 7 European Business 
Organization L. Rev. 357; C Gerner-Beuerle, P Paech and EP Schuster, ‘Study on Directors’ Duties and 
Liability’ (2013) <http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/50438/> accessed 11 December 2018. 
111 Ibid.  
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excessive compensation to directors and causing the company to enter into undervalue 
transactions.112 As the ultimate test for wrongful trading is whether directors have 
taken necessary steps to minimise losses to creditors, it is also possible for premature 
cessation of trading to incur liability.  
 
C. Effectiveness of the wrongful trading provision 
In theory, wrongful trading liability can incentivise directors to avoid taking excessive 
risks and incurring additional losses to creditors when the shareholders’ equity is nearly 
depleted. In reality however, the application of the UK wrongful trading provision is 
problematic and remains controversial. Not many actions are brought and few cases are 
successful. Wrongful trading is significantly less used compared with other insolvency 
law provisions on directors' liability including malfeasance (s.212), undervalue 
transaction (s.238), and preferences (s.239). Wrongful trading is also cited infrequently 
in director disqualification cases.113 
 
The low use of wrongful trading cases may be caused by an insolvency practitioner's 
lack of funds to bring such actions, especially when the company's assets are few. A 
possible solution to this problem is to give individual creditors a direct right of action 
but this solution may cause multiplicity of procedures, undermine the pari passu 
 
112  Kristin Van Zwieten Goode on Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law (5th edition, Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2018), p 768. 
113 Richard Williams, ‘What Can We Expect to Gain from Reforming the Insolvent Trading Remedy?’ 
(2015) 78 Modern Law Review 55. 
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principle and create unfair distribution among creditors. 114  It is also questionable 
whether individual creditors are motivated to bring an action given uncertainties about 
the prospects of success and the amount of compensation held to be payable. English 
courts are usually wary of hindsight bias and unwilling to second-guess the business 
judgment of directors.115 
 
It has been argued that wrongful trading should be triggered earlier than currently 
provided e.g. when directors know or ought to have known that a cash-flow insolvency 
is more probable than not.116 This is consistent with the proposal made by the UK 
Company Law Review Steering Group that directors' duty to take measures to reduce 
losses to creditors should arise once there is a substantial probability of an insolvent 
liquidation.117 However, even under the ‘more probable than not’ test, the trigger point 
for directors’ duty to creditors may be too late and not provide enough incentive for 
directors to take early and preventive measures for the interests of creditors and other 
stakeholders. 
 
Due to the low number of cases, the deterrent and compensatory effects of the wrongful 
 
114 Bachner (n 100). 
115  Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission, Company Directors : Regulating Conflicts of 
Interests and Formulating a Statement of Duties : A Joint Consultation Paper Paper,  (Stationery Office 
1998), at para 15.30; Andrew Keay, ‘Wrongful Trading and the Liability of Company Directors: A 
Theoretical Perspective’ (2005) 25 Legal Studies 431. 
116 Bachner (n 100). 
117 The Company Law Review Steering Group, Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy Final 
Report, (Department of Trade and Industry 2001), at para 3.17. 
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trading provision are doubtful. It might be argued that the existence of the wrongful 
trading has already constrained directors' conducts but there is no real empirical 
evidence to support the assumption that wrongful trading constitutes a credible threat. 
Even after reforms to extend the power to bring wrongful trading actions to 
administrators and allow liquidator/administrator to assign causes of action,118 it is 
unlikely that the use of wrongful trading will increase substantially.119  
 
However, despite the criticism, the wrongful trading rule is regarded as indispensable 
by many jurisdictions. In 2002, the High Level Group of Company Law Experts, 
established by the European Commission, recommended that an EU wrongful trading 
rule should be introduced based on the UK model to promote the dual goals of 
protecting creditors and allowing directors’ the choice to rescue the company or put it 
into liquidation.120 Recently, Hong Kong and Singapore, two major financial centres, 
have made major reforms regarding wrongful trading. The Hong Kong government has 
announced that it is going to propose a bill in the Legislative Year 2018/2019 that will 
introduce corporate rescue procedure and insolvent trading provisions (equivalent to 
 
118 Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015 (SBEE), ss 117–119.  
119 It has been argued the low use of wrongful trading might indicate that risk-taking behaviour, as 
suggested by Cork Report, are actually uncommon. Also, wrongful trading can overlap with other 
insolvency provisions such as preferencepreferences. Therefore, eliminating the perceived constraints of 
the wrongful trading will not increase its usage - see Richard Williams, ‘What Can We Expect to Gain 
from Reforming the Insolvent Trading Remedy?’ (2015) 78 Modern Law Review 55. 
120 J Winter, "Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts on a Modern Regulatory 
Framework for Company Law in Europe", (4 November 2002), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/modern/report_en.pdf (accessed on April 30, 2013); 
Andrew Keay, ‘The Shifting of Directors’ Duties in the Vicinity of Insolvency’ (2015) 24 International 
Insolvency Review 140. 
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UK wrongful trading).121 In Singapore, the Insolvency, Restructuring and Dissolution 
Act 2018 contains a new wrongful trading provision. It discards the current requirement 
that civil liability only arises where there has been a criminal conviction.122 These 
reform attempts have provided some evidence that the problem of excessive risk taking 
may be real and serious across the jurisdictions and it is necessary to design specific 
legal rules to address the problem.  
 
D. Proposed new reform measures in the UK and EU 
It is often difficult to recover assets from directors ex post and preventive measures that 
can facilitate restructuring may be better in increasing value for creditors when a 
company is in financial difficulty. The collapse of British Home Stores (BHS), one of 
the most high-profile corporate failures in the UK, is a case in point. In running the 
company into insolvency and transferring wealth from it, the company controllers 
arguably caused massive job losses and left a huge deficit in the pension funds.123 The 
unethical practices in BHS have been criticised as ‘the unacceptable face of 
 
121 ‘Companies Registration and Insolvency Administration’ (2018) 
<https://www.cr.gov.hk/en/publications/factsheets.htm> accessed 29 December 2018. 
122 Under s 230 Insolvency, Restructuring and Dissolution Act 2018, a company will ‘trade wrongfully’ 
if it incurs debt or liabilities, when insolvent (or becomes insolvent as a result of incurring such debt or 
liability), without reasonable prospect of meeting them in full. The provision is in fact much closer to the 
Australian wrongful trading provision than the English provision.  On this see chapter 9 of the Report 




123 Alastair Hudson, ‘BHS and the Reform of Corporate Law’ (2016) 37 Company Lawyer 364; Neshat 
Safari and Martin Gelter, ‘British Home Stores Collapse: The Case for an Employee Derivative Claim’ 
(2018) Journal of Corporate Law Studies 1. 
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capitalism’.124 Currently, the liquidators of BHS are investigating whether directors 
have breached their fiduciary duties and might bring litigation in respect of undervalue 
transaction and wrongful trading. With hindsight, one could argue that a preventive 
restructuring framework that gives early warning to shareholders and directors and 
require them to reduce losses at an early stage might be more useful than insolvency-
triggered provisions. 
 
In response to high profile corporate failures such as BHS and Carillion, the UK 
government has announced major reform plans on restructuring and bankruptcy that 
aim at facilitating rescue for financially-distressed companies, improving transparency 
and strengthening directors’ duties. 125   They have certain similarities with the 
reorganization chapter of the US Bankruptcy Code – Chapter 11 – and recent legislative 
reforms in Singapore.126 In the EU, legislative measures to facilitate restructuring 
before the commencement of formal insolvency procedures have been proposed passed 
by the European Commission127 in order to promote jobs and economic growth and to 
 
124  Paddy Ireland, ‘From Lonrho to BHS: The Changing Character of Corporate Governance in 
Contemporary Capitalism’ (2018) 29 King’s Law Journal 3. 
125 See ‘A Review of the Corporate Insolvency Framework’ 25th May and ‘Consultation on insolvency 
and corporate governance: government response’ 26th August 2018 which are both available on 
https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/a-review-of-the-corporate-insolvency-framework 
126 See the Singapore Insolvency, Restructuring and Dissolution Act 2018 which is expected to come 
into force some in 2019 and the reports of two committees,  Insolvency Law Review Committee (2016) 
available at 
https://www.mlaw.gov.sg/content/dam/minlaw/ipto/assets/documents/Report%20of%20the%20Insolve
ncy%20Law%20Review%20Committee.pdfand Committee to Strengthen Singapore as an International 
Centre for Debt Restructuring, ‘Report of the Committee’ (2016) available at 
https://www.mlaw.gov.sg/content/dam/minlaw/corp/News/Report of the Committee.pdf 
127 COMDirective (2016)723 final 2016EU) 2019/0359 (COD). Political agreement was reached 1023 of 
20 June 2019 on preventive restructuring frameworks, on discharge of debt and disqualifications, and on measures 
to increase the text efficiency of procedures concerning restructuring, insolvency and discharge of debt – OJ L 
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reduce significant barriers to the free flow of capital arising from divergent 
restructuring and insolvency law regimes in the EU Member States. At the present, 
there is no specific duty in most Member States that requires directors to take preventive 
actions.128  
 
Although the new proposal Directive will not create a uniform EU-wide restructuring 
and insolvency regime, it will establish a minimum legal framework for preventive 
restructurings in all EU States that ensures restructurings are undertaken at an early 
stage and limits the role of the courts and administrative authorities. The proposed new 
regime has absorbed elements from both the English scheme of arrangement and the 
US Chapter 11.129 In particular, Article 18 of the proposal 19 requires Member States 
to impose specific duties on directors in the vicinity of insolvency and thereby 
incentivise directors to pursue early restructuring and preserve the value of the 
business.130  
 
172/18 – and available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32019L1023&from=EN 
According to Article 34 of the minimum harmonisation restructuring directive on 19th December 2018 
but Directive, EU Member States are obliged to implement the necessary linguistic revisions have yet 
provisions of the Directive in their domestic law by 17th July 2021 though they are also entitled to a one 
year extension to be completed and the text published this time frame if they encounter particular 
difficulties in the Official Journal  - see https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-
releases/2018/12/19/eu-agrees-new-rules-on-business-insolvency/implementation. 
128 In some Member States in the EU, represented by the UK, the duty of directors will shift when a 
company is near insolvency or is insolvent. In most EU countries, such as Germany, the nature of 
director's duty has not changed when the company is approaching insolvency, but the directors are usually 
obliged to file for insolvency. See Gerard McCormack, ‘Corporate Restructuring Law-A Second Chance 
for Europe?’ (2017) 42 European Law Review 532; ‘Business restructuring law in Europe: making a 
fresh start’ (2017) 17 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 167. 
129 N Tollenaar, ‘The European Commission’s Proposal for a Directive on Preventive Restructuring 
Proceedings’ <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2978137> accessed 11 December 
2018. 




E. Comparative analysis of wrongful trading and the liquidation duty in China  
The wrongful trading provision might be the closest analogy under the UK law to the 
liquidation duty under Chinese law. Both regimes can incentivise directors/controlling 
shareholders to address a company’s financial difficulties in a timely fashion. If they 
fail to do so and cause losses to creditors, they will lose their limited liability protection 
and be held liable to creditors. As creditor protection paradigms shift from ex ante legal 
capital requirements,131  wrongful trading liability and the liquidation duty can be 
meaningful ex post measures to safeguard creditor interests.     
 
The rationales however, behind the liquidation duty and the wrongful trading provision 
are strikingly different. Wrongful trading is designed to alleviate the problem of 
 
‘Member States shall lay down rules to ensure that, where there is a likelihood of 
insolvency, directors, directors have due regard, as a minimum, to the following obligations: 
following: (a)to take immediate steps to minimise ) the loss for interests of creditors, workers, 
shareholders equity holders and other stakeholders; 
 
; (b)to have due regard to ) the interests of creditors and other stakeholders; 
 
(c)need to take reasonable steps to avoid insolvency; 
 
; and (d)c) the need to avoid deliberate or grossly negligent conduct that threatens the viability of the 
businessbusiness .’ 
 
131 John Armour, ‘Legal Capital: An Outdated Concept?’ (2006) 7 European Business Organization Law 
Review 5; W Schön, ‘The Future of Legal Capital’ (2004) 5 European Business Organization Law 
Review 429; RA Booth, ‘Capital Requirements in United States Corporation Law’ [2005] Villanova 
University Legal Working Paper Series 102; Wen and Zhao (n 7). 
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excessive risk taking when the company is approaching insolvency. By way of contrast, 
the liquidation duty is intended to force directors/shareholders to put the company into 
the formal liquidation procedure and thereby constrain the widespread debt evasion 
problem in China. It has not specifically contemplated the problem of excessive risk 
taking in a financial distress scenario. 
 
The liquidation duty and wrongful trading have a very different scope of application 
and the analogy breaks down however when it comes to solvent liquidation. Wrongful 
trading is confined to formal insolvency procedures while the liquidation duty also 
applies to liquidation caused by reasons other than insolvency and is enforced outside 
of the formal insolvency. For example, the UK wrongful trading will not catch 
deregistering the company without liquidation, while this is explicitly prohibited under 
the liquidation duty. The liquidation duty will not prevent directors from liquidating the 
company prematurely and causing losses to creditors but this may be subject to the UK 
wrongful trading provision. .132  
 
There are other differences. Individual creditors have standing to sue 
shareholders/directors for breach of the liquidation duty and compensation will go to 
the claimant if the action is successful. In contrast, under wrongful trading, the 
insolvency practitioner will enforce the claim; compensation will accrue to the debtor’s 
 
132 Kristin Van Zwieten Goode on Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law (5th edition, Sweet & 




estate and is available for creditors as a whole.  
 
F. Potential introduction of a wrongful trading remedy and other reforms in China  
We have seen that the liquidation duty and the wrongful trading provision have different 
functions and there is actually no equivalent provision to wrongful trading in China. 
This raises the question whether something like a wrongful trading remedy that contains 
an obligation to file for formal insolvency proceedings and further restructuring 
measures should be introduced in China. To consider the feasibility of the 
transplantation, we should first recall the fact that although the liquidation duty is 
relatively effective in addressing the debt evasion problem, it can create unfair results 
for minority shareholders and creditors who fail to raise the claim before others. 
Compared with the liquidation duty action, an efficient formal insolvency law can 
apportion liability and compensation in a fairer and more equitable manner.  
 
In addition, dramatic changes have taken place upon the in relation tothe business 
environment in China since the liquidation duty was first developed and in the current 
context, it can no longer fully serve the purpose of creditor protection. Since China’s 
accession to the WTO, it has become a major destination for foreign direct 
investment133 and an increasing number of Chinese companies turn to the offshore 
bond market to raise funds from overseas creditors.134 The lack of a well-functioning 
 
133  Li Weida, ‘China the Largest Recipient of FDI in H1, Says Report’ (2018) 
<https://gbtimes.com/china-the-largest-recipient-of-fdi-in-h1-says-report> accessed 29 December 2018. 
134  Han Jingyan, ‘Rise in Offshore Bond Issuance May Continue’ (Chinadaily, 2018) 
<http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201803/05/WS5a9ca7a2a3106e7dcc13f8d7.html> accessed 29 
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formal insolvency regime has increased risks for international investors135 and may 
discourage foreign investment and push the price of capital up for Chinese companies.  
 
In order to improve the use of the formal insolvency procedure in China, it might be 
necessary to impose a duty on directors and controlling shareholders to file for 
insolvency. The effectiveness of such a duty however, are complicated by government 
intervention and other factors impeding the use of formal insolvency procedures in 
China. If a duty to file for insolvency is introduced into China, it needs to provide 
certainty on issues such as when the liability will arise, how to calculate compensation 
and the defences available to directors and controlling shareholders. Although one 
would sacrifice the benefit of flexibility, a provision that leaves too much discretion to 
the courts may be unrealistic and problematic in the Chinese context.   
 
Measures to promote early stage restructuring should also be considered. The lessons 
for China from recent international reforms is that when the company is approaching 
insolvency, directors and controlling shareholders should have the duty to take early 
actions to reduce losses and to initiate out-of-court restructuring before formal 
insolvency proceedings become necessary. There is a need to avoid premature 
liquidation, to rescue viable businesses and to protect the interests of creditors, 
employees and other stakeholders. Under the current law, even if the company enters 
 
December 2018. 
135 Rebecca Parry and Nan Gao, ‘The Future Direction of China’s Cross-Border Insolvency Laws, 
Related Issues and Potential Problems’ (2018) 27 International Insolvency Review 5. 
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into reorganisation, which is one of the formal insolvency procedures in China, the 
whole process may be time-consuming and costly.136  
 
To achieve a balance between timely resolution and rescuing viable businesses, a 
preventive restructuring framework that promotes early, out-of-court restructurings 
needs to be established in China. When the company becomes financially distressed 
and before the duty to file for insolvency arises, directors and controlling shareholders 
should have the duty to inform creditors about the financial conditions of the company 
with a view to facilitating early negotiations. In the EU, it has been found that countries 
where restructuring is most common, recovery rates are higher. 137  Preventive 
restructuring can promote economic growth and employment, reduce losses to creditors 
and other stakeholders, and address the bad loans in the banking system.138  
 
A preventive restructuring framework can also provide a forum for employees to be 
involved in the early negotiations. Although Chinese company law does not contain a 
provision that requires directors to consider the interests of employees, employee 
welfare and social stability is an important social policy in China.139 Employees also 
 
136 Zinian Zhang and Roman Tomasic, ‘Corporate Reorganization Reform in China: Findings from an 
Empirical Study in Zhejiang’ (2016) 11 Asian Journal of Comparative Law 55. 
137 See COM(2016)723 final 2016/0359 (COD), Explanatory Memorandum. 
138 See COM(2016)723 final 2016/0359 For a discussion on the effects of corporate rescue in the EU 
context, see McCormack (CODn 125), Explanatory Memorandum. 
139 Social stability is also an important benchmark for local officials and the collapse of large companies 
would could cause social instability. The central government has reiterated that political stability is 
essential for the economy and made it an essential assessment criterion for local officials. See Yanling 
He and Guanglong Wang, ‘Order in Chaos: Re-Understand Social Instability in China’ (2016) 1 Journal 
of Chinese Governance 228. 
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have preferential claims under the EBL.140 In practice, local governments usually 
intervene in the insolvency process for fear of large-scale unemployment and social 
instability. 141  A preventive framework that can facilitate communication and 
cooperation among all parties including shareholders (State as well as non-State 
shareholders), creditors, employees and the local government can greatly enhance the 
possibility of rescuing the business and an orderly resolution if the restructuring fails. 
 
If China does not make necessary reforms to enhance fairness and efficiency in 
resolving corporate insolvency, it is possible that large Chinese conglomerates with 
international shareholders and creditors could be forced to resort to ‘forum shopping’ 
and choose jurisdictions that are more effective for resolving cross-border insolvency. 
With its flexible and advanced regime for corporate restructuring, Singapore might 
 
140 EBL 2006, article 113 
141 Bankruptcy of large enterprises has frequently led to the 'mass accidents' by laid-off workers, namely 
collective protests in the public arena. See He and Wang (n 127). 
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become a major destination for cross-border restructuring of Chinese conglomerates142 
though the large degree of State participation in such enterprises in China may militate 
against this prospect coming to pass. It is possible, however, for judgments and orders 
from Singapore courts to be recognised and enforced by Chinese courts. In Kolmar 
Group v Jiangsu Textile Industry (2016), the Nanjing Intermediate People’s Court in 
Jiangsu recognised a Singapore judgment thereby reciprocating the enforcement of a 
Chinese court judgment by the Supreme Court of Singapore.143 
 
Forum shopping in the context of cross-border insolvency may secure the benefits of 
more advantageous ‘restructuring friendly’ law. International creditors can choose 
advanced jurisdictions so as to avoid perceived uncertainty and unfairness in the legal 
procedures of the debtor’s home country. But forum shopping can be used to protect 
the interests of the directors and controlling shareholders or to benefit certain groups of 
 
142 Promoting flexible restructuring is a focus of reform in Singapore. In 2017, Singapore enacted a new 
law with the aspiration to become an international restructuring centre and "a natural choice for business 
undergoing cross-border debt restructurings in the Asia Pacific region". The Act has not only adopted 
the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross Border Insolvency but also established a restructuring regime that 
combines the advantages of the English scheme of arrangement and the US Chapter 11. Foreign debtors 
now can seek to restructure under the Singaporean scheme of arrangement through re-domiciliation in 
addition to relying on the “substantial connection test”. On the reforms see Report of the Committee to 
Strengthen Singapore as an International Centre for Debt Restructuring (2016) -
https://www.mlaw.gov.sg/content/dam/minlaw/corp/News/Report of the Committee.pdf; Gerard 
McCormack and Wan Wai Yee, ‘Transplanting Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code into Singapore’s 
restructuring and insolvency laws: opportunities and challenges’ (2019) Journal of Corporate Law 
StudiesStudies 69-104. 
 
143 Ibid.  
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creditors at the cost of involuntary or non-adjusting creditors.144 The insolvency of a 
large company may have disastrous effects on the community where it operates, and if 
its insolvency resolution is conducted in a foreign jurisdiction, major stakeholders such 
as employees and trade creditors may, in practice, be excluded from participating in the 
insolvency proceedings.  
 
To sum up, although the liquidation duty can serve as an expedient means to constrain 
debt evasion, China should make further reforms to strengthen its insolvency and 
restructuring law and keep pace with the international developments. This is 
particularly important for the ongoing government efforts to deleverage the corporate 
sector, reduce non-performing loans in the financial system and resolve zombie 
companies.145 
 
VI. Conclusion  
For many years, China has been importing legal rules from developed jurisdictions with 
mixed results. On the one hand, the use of legal transplants have saved time and 
resources in addressing problems that arise as China is transitioning from a planned 
economy to a market based economy. On the other hand, some imported legal rules are 
 
144 Horst Eidenmüller, ‘Abuse of Law in the Context of European Insolvency Law’ (2009) 6 European 
Company and Financial Law Review 1 . 






ineffective and underused, as they do not fit well with the local economic and political 
conditions. Directors' duties might be a case in point and there are no comparable rules 
under Chinese law to impose creditor-regarding duties on directors when the company 
is in the vicinity of insolvency. Chinese corporate law has however, provided an 
alternative solution in the form of the liquidation duty and this duty has been mainly 
shaped by the SPC. 
 
This paper has argued that the liquidation duty, as an internally developed rule, is 
relatively effective in deterring debt evasion and compensating creditors. It provides 
creditors with a private enforcement mechanism to fill the gaps of public regulation 
brought about by deregulatory efforts. The analysis on the liquidation duty has led us 
to the conclusion that a country such as China might develop functional rules that are 
embedded in its legal, economic and political institutions and that are products of its 
own history. The divergence from the 'developed' model of corporate governance does 
not mean that there are no rules to address relevant problems. 
 
Nevertheless, the analysis shows that the liquidation duty may undermine the value of 
the formal insolvency law and lead to unfairness and inefficiency. Also, as China is 
further integrated into the global economy and corporate insolvency becomes a 
transnational matter, it is important for China to keep pace with the international 
developments and improve the business environment for international investors. This 
paper proposes that insolvency filing duties and rules for preventive restructuring 
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should be introduced into the current framework though we have also stressed the 
necessity for careful drafting. The future for creditor protection in China lies in an 
effective and efficient formal insolvency law and a flexible framework for out-of-court 
restructuring.  
 
In a wordTo emphasise, this paper advocates for a pragmatic and contextual approach 
to legal reform. It suggests that the important question in comparative legal study is not 
whether certain laws are being transplanted and are converging towards the same model, 
it is whether laws are compatible with unique social and political conditions of a country. 
For countries with emerging economics, a hybrid corporate governance model with 
double agency problems, 146  and constantly changing external conditions, it is 
important for the law to continue to evolve and adapt. After all, the message from 
Darwin’s Origin of Species is that it is not the strongest species survives but the one 
that is able best to adapt and adjust to the changing environment.147  
 
 
146 Double agency problems refer to conflicts between boards of directors and shareholders and conflicts 
between controlling and minority shareholders while the latter kind of problem can well involve state 
State and government agencies. See Zhao and Keay (n 7). 
147 Leon C Megginson, ‘Lessons from Europe for American Business’ (1963) 44  Southwestern Social 
Science Quarterly 3. 
